The Texas A&M University system has embarked on a new accountability program. For every department — indeed, for every professor — revenue generated and cost incurred are calculated; and profit — the difference — is reported. Each professor is presumably supposed to have a marginal revenue product above his/her compensation.
Cost (at least the professor’s pay) is easy to calculate. Unfortunately, the calculation of revenue includes only outside grants received and tuition revenue. Any unfunded research, no matter where published, is assumed to have zero value, as is any service. Were this to spread throughout Texas (as I sadly expect it will), any publication — even in the most visible scholarly outlet, even if it affects how the average person thinks about the world — would be valued at zero; so too would an appearance in a nationally visible media outlet.
University administrators facing these incentives would have every reason to construct a faculty of grant-hustlers and low-paid teachers (subject, one might perhaps vainly hope, to some minimum teaching quality). Despite the traditional UT-A&M rivalry, I hate to see a great institution do this damage to itself. Worse still, this kind of mindless accounting, if it spreads, would increase still further the widening gulf between the quality of the nation’s best private universities and its top public universities. Very depressing — especially to someone who has spent 38 years teaching at public universities.
via freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com
Warning: rant ahead
As economists, we try to understand incentives and how people respond to those incentives. If you want a certain outcome, then you have to understand what incentives people have to generate those outcomes. I can imagine the good intentions of the TAMU administration hoping to put in place a system of incentives designed to incentivise faculty to generate more classroom contact with students and more grant income for the University. These are both ways Departments and Universities can counter repeated budget cuts. Unfortunately, often good intentions lead to unintended consequences. If you tell faculty that their compensation adjustments will be based only on the # of students they teach and the amount of grant money they generate, guess what faculty will do? Yep, they will scramble to teach large section introductory classes in large lecture halls getting as many butts in seats as possible. Then they will spend the rest of their nonteaching time writing grant proposal after grant proposal throwing as much s@#! against the wall as they can to see how much (not even what) sticks. In the long term, the results get worse. As good researchers are driven to occupations where research outputs are awarded, they are replaced, as Dr. Hammermesh points our, with grant chasing low paid teachers with no incentives to improve.
OK, rant over.