Kenneth Rogoff wrote a column in the Financial Times arguing "why the world cannot grow itself out of this slowdown." He has a lot to say about the global imbalances leading to the current crisis, and I mostly found myself nodding along, but then comes this zinger: high commodity prices are
prima facie
evidence that the global economy is still growing too fast
and that
it will probably take a couple of years of sub-trend growth to
rebalance commodity supply and demand at trend price levels (perhaps
$75 per barrel in the case of oil, down from the current $124).
Here's my response from the FT's Economists' Forum:
High oil prices are not a sign that we have grown too fast, they are
a sign that demand for oil has gone up. Yes, the two are closely
related, but there’s a crucial degree of freedom in play: energy
intensity.
High oil prices in the 1970s prompted a decrease in oil per unit of
output, a trend that has continued to a lesser extent since then. It is
no secret that climate change, one of the other major crises facing the
world at the moment, will require us to make large strides in that
direction. (McKinsey introduced the useful concept of “carbon productivity” and shows why it needs to – and, crucially, how it can – rise tenfold by 2050.)
Energy prices – and oil in particular – have risen so dramatically
for a deep underlying reason, albeit one that’s possible to express in
simple terms: demand has gone up, while the resources themselves are
becoming ever scarcer.
The best answer to high oil prices is using less oil, not scaling
back the use of capital and labour to bring oil prices down to “trend.”
Krugman makes a very similar point on his blog. An anonymous scribe over at the Economist seems to agree:
The cure for excess commodity demand is high commodity prices. ...
Inflation is a concern. The perpetuation of imbalances is a concern. Growth is not a concern.
Oddly, most other commenters at the FT's own Economists' Forum are just nodding along throughout.