My "contingent valuation" Google Alert sent me this one:
Consequentiality: A Theoretical and Experimental Exploration of a Single Binary Choice
Author(s): Richard T. Carson, Theodore Groves, and John A. List
Source: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Vol. 1, No. 1
(Spring/Summer 2014), pp. 171-207
1. Title: Natural Capital: From Metaphor to Measurement
Author(s): Eli P. Fenichel and Joshua K. Abbott
Source: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2014), pp. 1-27
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/676034
Abstract: Abstract Current efforts to value ecosystem services have contributed little to the valuation of natural capital, suggesting that in practice “nature is capital” primarily serves as a metaphor. We provide a theoretically motivated approach for recovering natural capital prices that expands beyond idealized management to encompass current, likely inefficient, management institutions. Theoretically consistent capital valuation requires adjusting for the net marginal productivity of the natural capital asset and price appreciation. We develop a numerical approach for approximating the value of capital that integrates estimates from ecology and economics. We employ the method to recover credible accounting prices for a pound of Gulf of Mexico reef fish as a capital asset under real-world management conditions. Our approach reveals the interdisciplinarity of natural capital valuation and the importance of understanding the feedbacks between the state of natural capital stocks, human behavior affecting these stocks, and the role of institutions in shaping that feedback.
2. Title: Can Negotiating a Uniform Carbon Price Help to Internalize the Global Warming Externality?
Author(s): Martin L. Weitzman
Source: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2014), pp. 29-49
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/676039
Abstract: Abstract It is difficult to resolve the global warming free-rider externality problem by negotiating n different quantity targets. By contrast, negotiating a single internationally binding minimum carbon price (the proceeds from which are domestically retained) counters self-interest by incentivizing agents to internalize the externality. The model of this article indicates an exact sense in which each agent’s extra cost from a higher emissions price is counterbalanced by that agent’s extra benefit from inducing all other agents to simultaneously lower their emissions in response to the higher price. Some implications are discussed. While the study is centered on a formal model, the tone of the policy discussion resembles more an exploratory think piece.
3. Title: Negative Leakage
Author(s): Kathy Baylis, Don Fullerton, and Daniel H. Karney
Source: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2014), pp. 51-73
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/676449
Abstract: Abstract Our analytical general equilibrium model solves for effects of a small increase in carbon tax on leakage—the increase in emissions elsewhere. Identical consumers buy two goods using income from endowments that are mobile between sectors. Usually an increase in one sector’s tax raises output price, so consumption shifts to the other good, causing positive leakage. Here, we find a new negative effect not recognized in existing literature: the taxed sector substitutes away from carbon into clean inputs, so it may absorb resources, shrink the other sector, and reduce their emissions. This “abatement resource effect” could offset some or all of the positive effect. We show that this effect can substantially affect estimates of leakage and is robust to model extensions.
4. Title: Using Markets for Woody Biomass Energy to Sequester Carbon in Forests
Author(s): Alice Favero and Robert Mendelsohn
Source: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2014), pp. 75-95
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/676033
Abstract: Abstract Although storing more carbon in forests should be part of an efficient mitigation program, it is unclear how to create effective incentives to make this happen. The literature largely has focused on giving landowners direct incentives to store carbon. This paper explores an alternative mechanism to increase forest carbon sequestration by creating a market for wood bioenergy. By raising the value of wood, the program encourages landowners to convert vast amounts of land to forest, which incidentally increases forest carbon. By providing an indirect subsidy on woody biomass, governments can give even more incentive to reward this carbon sequestration.
5. Title: Regulating Greenhouse Gases from Coal Power Plants under the Clean Air Act
Author(s): Joshua Linn, Erin Mastrangelo, and Dallas Burtraw
Source: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2014), pp. 97-134
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/676038
Abstract: Abstract The Clean Air Act has assumed the central role in US climate policy, directing the development of regulations governing greenhouse gas emissions from existing coal-fired power plants. This paper uses a model of power plant operation and efficiency investments to compare the cost-effectiveness of alternative policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from coal plants. We empirically estimate the key model parameters from a data set of the operation of coal-fired generating units over 25 years. We find that a 10% increase in coal prices causes a 0.1%–0.4% improvement in efficiency (electricity production per ton of coal), which is broadly consistent with engineering assessments of the cost of improving efficiency. We also find that coal prices have a significant effect on utilization. Using the estimates to compare alternative policies, we find performance standards are less efficient than a tax because they cause greater utilization.
6. Title: Waste of Effort? International Environmental Agreements
Author(s): Derek Kellenberg and Arik Levinson
Source: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2014), pp. 135-169
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/676037
Abstract: Abstract Most evidence suggests that the 1,000 or so different International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) operating today are ineffectual, merely ratifying business-as-usual outcomes. But much of that empirical analysis faces two obstacles: (1) limited data from before the IEAs were enacted and thus an inability to make before-and-after comparisons and (2) difficulty estimating the counterfactual outcomes—what would have happened absent the agreements. We study one particular IEA—the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. In this special case we do have data prior to the agreement, enabling us to identify the treaty’s effects using annual bilateral waste shipments among countries before and after one of the trading partners ratifies the agreement. Despite the strengths of this approach, we find almost no evidence that the Convention has resulted in less waste being shipped among countries.
7. Title: Consequentiality: A Theoretical and Experimental Exploration of a Single Binary Choice
Author(s): Richard T. Carson, Theodore Groves, and John A. List
Source: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2014), pp. 171-207
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/676450
Abstract: Abstract Researchers, using contingent valuation (CV) to value changes in nonmarket goods, typically believe respondents always answer questions truthfully or they answer truthfully only when it is in their interest to do so. The second position, while consistent with economic theory, implies that interpreting survey responses depends critically on the incentive structure provided. We derive simple tests capable of distinguishing the two views. Our theoretical model for examining the incentive structure of a single binary choice relaxes the usual expected utility assumption. We test our theory using a field experiment involving voting to provide a public good. Experimental results are consistent theoretical predictions and cast doubt on the relevance of a large experimental literature using inconsequential questions and non-incentive-compatible mechanisms to make inferences about CV. The framework put forth should help in understanding the role played by theoretical conditions for preference elicitation and lend insight into the hypothetical bias literature.
8. Title: Harvest Allocation without Property Rights
Author(s): Jorge Holzer and Kenneth McConnell
Source: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2014), pp. 209-232
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/676451
Abstract: Abstract Resources are often allocated without property rights and the attendant market exchanges. Households commonly encounter these situations—access to schools, on-street parking. Fishing firms typically exploit stocks in a limited-entry setting under input controls. Absent transferable rights and the sorting of marginal values induced by price mechanisms, it is critical to understand the rules governing access. We study allocation of harvest among fishing sectors in this second-best context and demonstrate that optimal allocation combines information on probabilities of access with the standard information in marginal value schedules. We illustrate our arguments with data from the Gulf of Maine.
9. Title: The Welfare Effects of Energy Efficiency Standards When Choice Sets Matter
Author(s): Tsvetan Tsvetanov and Kathleen Segerson
Source: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2014), pp. 233-271
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/676036
Abstract: Abstract Existing studies point out various factors that might contribute to an “energy efficiency gap” but do not consider the potential effect of choice sets on behavior. In an earlier paper, we developed a theoretical model of the purchase of energy-using durables in which the choice set matters if consumers face price-driven temptation and self-control costs. In this paper, we use refrigerator market data to illustrate that, under such a preference structure, energy efficiency standards can have larger overall welfare benefits than previously recognized, suggesting the importance of considering choice sets in welfare analyses of standards.
10. Title: Estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon: Concepts and Results from the DICE-2013R Model and Alternative Approaches
Author(s): William Nordhaus
Source: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2014), pp. 273-312
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/676035
Abstract: Abstract The social cost of carbon (SCC) is an important concept for understanding and implementing climate change policies. This term represents the economic cost caused by an additional ton of carbon dioxide emissions (or more succinctly carbon) or its equivalent. The present study describes the development of the concept, provides examples of its use in current US regulator policies, examines its analytical background, and estimates the SCC using an updated integrated assessment model, the DICE-2013R model. The study estimates that the SCC is $18.6 per ton of CO2 in 2005 US dollars and international prices for the current period (2015). For the central case, the real SCC grows at 3% per year over the period to 2050. The major open issues concerning the SCC continue to be the appropriate discount rate, the potential for catastrophic damages, the impact of incomplete harmonization of abatement policies, and the effects of distortionary taxes.